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THE SUPREME COURT CONFRONTS THE GHOSTS OF ENRON: ASSESSING THE PAST,
PRESENT AND FUTURE OF CORPORATE FRAUD ENFORCEMENT
William J. Donoher, Missouri State University
The U.S. Supreme Court ended its 2010 term with a significant ruling on the appeal of former Enron CEO Jeffrey
Skilling that sharply curtailed application of the “honest services” doctrine, which had figured prominently in Skilling’s
conviction. The Court held that the conceptual breadth of the term “honest services” and the apparent inconsistency of
rulings applying the doctrine rendered it unconstitutionally vague unless confined to cases of bribery or kickbacks.
Notably, Enron and other corporate fraud cases did not involve either form of corruption. This article reviews the
development of the honest services doctrine, discusses and analyzes the Skilling decision, and argues that future corporate
fraud enforcement is likely to be hindered not only by the specifics of the Skilling decision but also by its underlying
ethical philosophy.
us to avoid that behavior without reviewing the law first.
Here, then, is the focal point of the dilemma of legal
definition, and the question to which we will return at the
end of this article: If the purpose of the law is to provide
notice of criminality, but most of us inherently recognize the
existence of circumstances that would, at best, be
questionable or unethical, who will review the law first, and
with what motive?
Although most of us are, indeed, likely to avoid
situations such as those described above, all of these
hypotheticals represent actual cases prosecuted under what
has come to be known as the honest services doctrine. Thus,
someone acted unethically or criminally in each of these
cases, and all were convicted as a consequence. The first
scenario involves one of the most common forms of
corruption, that of the public official who abuses his or her
office for personal gain. The last scenario generally
describes the Enron fraud. Notice that each involves a
somewhat different contextual and factual background, but
all invoke our common concern with unethical or criminal
behavior. And yet, under the Supreme Court’s review of
Jeffrey Skilling’s conviction, only the first of these clearly
would be covered by the honest services doctrine, which, as
the Court held, can now only be applied to cases involving
bribery or kickbacks.
This article surveys the honest services doctrine,
summarizes and evaluates the Supreme Court’s decision in
Skilling’s appeal, and assesses its likely future impact. With
regard to the latter, the central argument advanced here is
that, although alternative theories of liability or criminality
might apply to any or all of the remaining scenarios
described above and to similar future cases, the Court’s
ruling effectively limits prosecutors’ latitude in pursuing and
prosecuting fraud, and thereby limits the deterrent value of
fraud enforcement. Discussion begins below with a look at
the origin and development of the honest services doctrine,
after which the Skilling decision and its future impact will
be considered.

What kinds of unethical behavior are significant
enough, or reprehensible enough, to rise to the level of
criminality, and how do we define that conduct? Broadly
speaking, this was the question facing the courts in the wake
of the Enron disaster and the subsequent prosecutions of the
executives who masterminded one of the most spectacular
frauds in corporate history. Before we begin looking more
closely at the specifics of the case brought before the United
States Supreme Court during its 2009-10 term, let us
consider the question posed here in light of the following
hypothetical situations:
•

•

•

•

A public official steers public business to a certain
contractor, who “refunds” a small percentage of the
contract proceeds to the official.
An employer seeking anonymity in certain
transactions directs one of its employees to hire an
outside entity to act as its contracting
representative. The employee instead establishes a
new business formed for that purpose, holding it
out to the employer as an independent company
with the requisite experience and skill to act on
behalf of the employer.
In a series of communications occurring over an
extended period of time, a job applicant discloses
her employer’s trade secrets to the prospective
employer.
An employee fails to disclose certain negative
information that would adversely affect the
company’s stock price and, thereby, the employee’s
compensation.

Few of us reviewing this list would have significant
difficulty deciding that all of these hypotheticals involve
behavior that is, at the very least, unethical if not criminally
fraudulent. And knowing or believing this, few of us would
be likely to act accordingly, whether or not we also took the
time to review relevant criminal statutes to determine
whether their definitions of criminality fit the facts of our
prospective behavior. Indeed, our beliefs likely would lead
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case of Section 1341, the two clauses in question were
enacted at different times, suggesting that Congress had
different things in mind even though both arguably could be
construed as “fraud” broadly defined. Further support for
this assumption was provided by the drafters’ use of the
conjunctive “or” in the 1909 amendment adding the second
clause, which courts quickly interpreted as suggesting that
the offense condemned by the law could be found in either
one of the two clauses.
Observing that the English language may be read in this
manner does not, of course, address the ultimate question of
meaning. But when read closely, Section 1341 seems to
suggest that the two offenses in question relate to fraud, on
the one hand, and false pretenses, on the other, if both
clauses are to be given independent meaning. What is
significant in this dichotomy is that fraud basically describes
a relationship between two parties, one of whom gains and
one of whom loses the amount in question. In other words,
it is a zero-sum arrangement in which the loss of one flows
directly to the benefit of the other. By contrast, whatever is
meant by “obtaining money or property by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises” is not
confined to such a zero-sum relationship. If you hire me to
do a particular job, and I do that job but also leverage my
position to gain side benefits, you have not lost nor have you
supplied my gain. A third party is involved in this scenario.
This was precisely the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110
(1941). (By way of background, the federal court system is
comprised of three levels, with the Supreme Court at the top,
followed by the 12 circuit courts (11 regional courts plus the
D.C. circuit), and finally the various district courts sitting in
each state. The latter are the system’s trial courts. The
circuit courts review the district courts’ findings of law and
issue rulings that are binding within the boundaries of their
individual jurisdiction. Circuit court rulings thus have no
binding effect in other circuits, but may serve as important
precedents for rulings by other circuit courts. Note that this
may create conflicts in the law, where one circuit court rules
one way on a particular issue while another adopts a
different rule. One of the functions of the U.S. Supreme
Court, should it decide to accept an appeal from the circuit
courts, is to resolve such conflicts between the circuits.)
There, the defendant engaged in essentially the same scheme
described in the first scenario at the beginning of this article.
The Fifth Circuit observed that "[i]t is not true that because
the [city] was to make and did make a saving by the
operations there could not have been an intent to defraud”
(id. at 119) that would rise to the level of condemnation
under Section 1341. Again, note the existence of the thirdparty, non-zero-sum relationship exhibited in this case,
which is distinct from the zero-sum arrangement we
typically associate with two-party fraud. This ruling became
the basis for what we know today as the honest services
doctrine.

THE PAST: THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF THE
HONEST SERVICES DOCTRINE
What we have come to know as the honest services
doctrine traces its lineage to the original U.S. mail fraud
statute (18 U.S.C. 1341), which was enacted in 1872.
Although honest services did not come into being
immediately upon enactment of this statute, the doctrine has
been developing for roughly a century and therefore should
not be seen as a completely new and unwelcome addition to
the law. To understand this evolution, we need to return to
the language of the statute and follow its interpretation by
the courts.
Today’s version of Section 1341, following several
amendments over time, reads in pertinent part as follows:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any
scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining
money or property by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises,…places in
any post office or authorized depository for mail
matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or
delivered by the Postal Service, or deposits or
causes to be deposited any matter or thing whatever
to be sent or delivered by any private or
commercial interstate carrier,… shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than 20
years, or both….
Clarity and parsimony of expression obviously were not
fully appreciated or valued by Congress, and in fact the
ambiguities of the statute’s language long have been noted.
What is a “scheme or artifice to defraud”? Exactly what
kinds of representations or actions are to be considered
provable as “false or fraudulent pretenses”? For that matter,
what is meant by “property”? Indeed, it is precisely
questions such as these that brought the issue of the statute’s
interpretation to the fore in Skilling’s appeal.
For our purposes, it is important to focus on the first two
clauses of the statute and the sequence of their adoption.
The initial version of Section 1341 omitted the second clause
covering those “obtaining money or property by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.”
Thus, as originally enacted, the statute applied only to “any
scheme or artifice to defraud”—leaving open the question of
what constituted a “scheme” or “artifice.” In 1909, the
statute was amended to add the “false or fraudulent
pretenses” clause. The question of what kinds of activities
actually were covered by the law remained undefined, and it
is a fair question whether this amendment otherwise clarified
or further confused the original meaning and intent.
In reviewing the statute, courts began to interpret the
separate clauses as applying to different kinds of acts.
Statutory interpretation generally assumes that different
parts of a statute have independent meaning unless they are
stated as simply providing examples or clarification. In the
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The intent clearly was to read back into the law, in explicit
fashion, the doctrine of honest services, but without
additional definitional clarity. The obvious question
remained, strictly on the basis of the statutory language:
What does “honest services” mean? In circumstances such
as these, the common approach is to incorporate the body of
law as developed, so that in regard to the honest services
doctrine, and in direct response to McNally, the decisions
applying honest services to third-party arrangements in
addition to traditional fraud and to both private and public
relationships were reinstated.
This brought to a close the evolutionary period of the
honest services doctrine. As suggested above, the principle
traces its origin to statutes enacted a century ago, and in its
more mature formulation to decisions and rulings that date
from the early 1940s. Even viewed from the perspective of
the newer Section 1346, which for the first time explicitly
read the phrase “honest services” into the statute books, the
doctrine has survived for more than 20 years. In all this, it is
important to note that application of the doctrine is, or
should not, be a surprise, even if the precise acts
contemplated are not spelled out in precise detail. There is a
principle underlying the doctrine, which, if not delineated in
stark language is, or should be, nonetheless apparent to those
seeking guidance from the law. Until Enron, that is.

But there remained a troubling issue of context in cases
such as these: Did the statute apply only to public
corruption, or could private employment relationships be
subject to its coverage as well? Note that Shushan involved
a case of public corruption, which had been the traditional
basis for cases brought under Section 1341. For the most
part, the public policy underlying prosecutions was to target
public officials who abused their offices for private gains.
Even though true as a matter of practice, nothing in the
statute explicitly limited its reach to public corruption.
Indeed, courts seem to have begun the extension of Section
1341 to the private employment context in 1942, shortly
after Shushan was decided (e.g., United States v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 47 F. Supp. 676, 678 (Mass. 1942)), and by
1982 all of the circuit courts had adopted the honest services
doctrine and its extension to the private realm (Coffee, 1983;
Hurson, 1983).
What seemed to be a settled legal principle was
unceremoniously halted in 1987, when the U.S. Supreme
Court considered the case of a state official who chose the
state’s insurance agent and attempted to have the agent pay a
kickback on its commissions to outside companies partially
owned by the official. In McNally v. United States, 483 U.S.
350, 362-364, 107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987), following the
approach and logic of the honest services doctrine, the state
had not alleged that, "in the absence of the alleged scheme
[,] the Commonwealth would have paid a lower premium or
secured better insurance." Instead, the prosecutor argued
that the kickback scheme "defraud[ed] the citizens and
government of Kentucky of their right to have the
Commonwealth's affairs conducted honestly." Id., at 353,
107 S. Ct. 2875. Note again the lack of a direct relationship
that is common to traditional fraud; once more, the scheme
involved a third party who supplied the benefit to the state
official.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court struck down this
aspect of the honest services doctrine. "Rather than
constru[ing] the statute in a manner that leaves its outer
boundaries ambiguous…,” the Court read the statute "as
limited in scope to the protection of property rights." Id., at
360, 107 S. Ct. 2875. "If Congress desires to go further, it
must speak more clearly." Ibid. The decision thus seemed to
read out of existence the second clause of Section 1341, or
to conflate its meaning with the first clause and interpret
both jointly. The result was that honest services
prosecutions were no longer permissible.
As it happened, Congress responded to McNally
immediately, passing a new Section 1346 in 1988 to “speak
more clearly” on the subject of honest services. The new
statute read:

THE PRESENT: ENRON, SKILLING AND THE
REDEFINITION OF HONEST SERVICES
By now, Enron is somewhat old news, but by the time
of its demise and in the months and years immediately
thereafter it was one of the most widely publicized firms in
American commercial history—first for its seemingly
unparalleled success, and then for its equally unparalleled
chicanery. Very elaborate mechanisms had been established
by the company involving off-balance-sheet transactions
with various entities ultimately connected to Enron itself, if
only one could penetrate the maze of complexity. In fact,
despite limited disclosure in its public filings, replete with
obscure references but lacking factual detail, a clear picture
of the company’s finances was impossible to obtain. And
yet other activities were successfully hidden completely.
The net effect was to give the appearance of success, even
though that success was precariously balanced on a
mountain of debt and other obligations that could bring
down the house of cards at a moment’s notice. Of course,
that is precisely what eventually transpired.
The various Enron executives were pursued and
prosecuted. Ken Lay, the company’s chairman, suffered a
heart attack while incarcerated. Jeffrey Skilling, the CEO,
continued to appeal his conviction, ultimately succeeding in
coming before the Supreme Court during its 2009-10 term.
The Court had this to say in summarizing the factual
background of the case in its ruling issued on June 24, 2010:

For the purposes of this chapter, the term “scheme
or artifice to defraud” includes a scheme or artifice
to deprive another of the intangible right of honest
services.
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The Court upheld the fair trial rulings of the lower courts,
and turned to the question of the honest services doctrine.
As an initial matter, the Court declined to invalidate
Section 1346, preferring instead to rely upon the general rule
of law favoring construction and interpretation. The
question for the Court then became defining the proper
meaning and limits of the honest services doctrine, given the
need for constitutional consistency. In other words,
whatever the meaning of the statute, it had to pass
constitutional muster. Returning to the McNally decision
and the subsequent adoption of Section 1346, the Court
observed that the statute was designed to reinstate preMcNally jurisprudence.
The Court could have ended its analysis at that point,
suggesting that, whatever the limitations of the language,
courts prior to the McNally decision did not seem to
encounter serious issues of indeterminacy. Nor had
vagueness challenges been readily entertained, at least
successfully. In short, looking at the body of the law as it
existed prior to McNally and the adoption of Section 1346,
there was nothing that compelled further decision.
But the Court continued:

Founded in 1985, Enron Corporation grew from its
headquarters in Houston, Texas, into one of the
world's leading energy companies. Skilling launched
his career there in 1990 when Kenneth Lay, the
company's founder, hired him to head an Enron
subsidiary. Skilling steadily rose through the
corporation's ranks, serving as president and chief
operating officer, and then, beginning in February
2001, as chief executive officer. Six months later, on
August 14, 2001, Skilling resigned from Enron.
Less than four months after Skilling's departure,
Enron spiraled into bankruptcy. The company's stock,
which had traded at $ 90 per share in August 2000,
plummeted to pennies per share in late 2001.
Attempting to comprehend what caused the
corporation's collapse, the U.S. Department of Justice
formed an Enron Task Force, comprising prosecutors
and FBI agents from around the Nation. The
Government's investigation uncovered an elaborate
conspiracy to prop up Enron's short-run stock prices
by overstating the company's financial well-being. In
the years following Enron's bankruptcy, the
Government prosecuted dozens of Enron employees
who participated in the scheme. In time, the
Government worked its way up the corporation's
chain of command: On July 7, 2004, a grand jury
indicted Skilling, Lay, and Richard Causey, Enron's
former chief accounting officer. These three
defendants, the indictment alleged, "engaged in a
wide-ranging scheme to deceive the investing public,
including Enron's shareholders . . . about the true
performance of Enron's businesses by: (a)
manipulating Enron's publicly reported financial
results; and (b) making public statements and
representations about Enron's financial performance
and results that were false and misleading." Skilling
and his co-conspirators, the indictment continued,
"enriched themselves as a result of the scheme
through salary, bonuses, grants of stock and stock
options, other profits, and prestige." (Skilling v. U.S.,
130 S. Ct. 2896, 2907 (2010)).

In parsing the Courts of Appeals decisions, we
acknowledge that Skilling's vagueness challenge
has force, for honest-services decisions preceding
McNally were not models of clarity or
consistency….While the honest-services cases
preceding McNally dominantly and consistently
applied the fraud statute to bribery and kickback
schemes -- schemes that were the basis of most
honest-services prosecutions -- there was
considerable disarray over the statute's application
to conduct outside that core category. (Id. at 2929.)
Thus, in order to avoid unconstitutional vagueness, the
general, or core, purpose and rule of the doctrine would be
invoked: Since most cases decided before McNally and the
adoption of Section 1346 involved bribery or kickback
schemes, that must necessarily be the core meaning and
understanding of the doctrine. Application of the law
beyond those kinds of situations would not be able to be
anticipated by potential defendants, and thus would fail on
vagueness grounds.
In a separate concurrence, Justice Scalia argued in favor
of outright invalidation. The cases and standards applied in
previous rulings, he maintained, were hopelessly
inconsistent and arose in a multiplicity of contextual
circumstances that would not afford a defendant a sufficient
opportunity to adjust his or her behavior. Thus, as a matter
of due process, Scalia believed that the entire statute should
be set aside.
It is important to note that the Court did not overturn
Skilling’s conviction. Rather, it sent the case back to the
lower courts for a precise definition of the basis of his
conviction. Given that multiple counts and theories were

As a result, prosecutors said, Skilling had deprived the
company and its shareholders of the intangible right of
honest services, citing directly to Section 1346. In addition,
Skilling was charged with more than 25 separate offenses,
including insider trading, securities fraud, wire fraud, and
making false representations to auditors.
Skilling eventually was convicted, but appealed, raising
claims based on the lack of a fair trial and the coverage of
Sections 1341 and 1346. In particular, he claimed that the
actions of which he was accused did not constitute a
conspiracy to commit honest services fraud, and in the
alternative that the statute was unconstitutionally vague.
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statute. Many cases, such as Enron, did not involve these
particular offenses, yet exhibited obviously culpable
behavior. For that matter, if we are searching for some
majority principle, why stop at the form of corruption? Most
cases brought under Sections 1341 and 1346 arose in the
public sphere. Why then did the Court not point to this
further distinction in announcing the “core” purpose of the
statute? In all of these instances, the Court seems to be
confusing context with substance in announcing a
substantive rule of law.
This leads to the second ground for concern: What is the
normative impact of Skilling? Recall once again our
opening scenarios above, and consider the ramifications of
the present decision for all but the first. What impact will
the announcement of this rule have on potential perpetrators
of similar deeds? Let us further suppose application of a
similar approach to enforcement to traffic law: If the speed
limit stays the same (whatever it may be), but everyone
“knows” that no one will be prosecuted for driving 5-10
miles per hour over the speed limit, what will be the result in
terms of behavior? In fact, we see this on our highways
everywhere. Now suppose that it is announced that radar
will no longer be used. Other enforcement methods remain
available for use (observation, “tailing” to estimate speed,
etc.), but only radar will be outlawed because it is inherently
subject to user interpretation and potential error. Will the
incidence of compliance with the underlying speed limits,
even within the existing 5-10 mile per hour “grace” zone, be
likely to increase or decrease? In the realm of corporate
fraud, this seems to be the end result of the logic of Skilling.
There is also a larger normative value at stake in the
context of corporate fraud, one that is partially disclosed by
the hypothetical discussion above. Most of us know what
proper behavior is, independent of black-letter law.
Certainly, most of us would have known that activities such
as those that occurred at Enron were morally, ethically, and
legally culpable. Would the definitional certainty demanded
by Skilling have made a difference? On the other hand, to
one engaged in such activities, knowing the precise
definition could have made all the difference, but only in
terms of knowing how to shape those activities to avoid
coming within the ambit of the statute. In fact, in terms of
the ethical foundation of the law, the statute really was not
vague prior to the Enron litigation, and its increased clarity
now is likely only to be of service to those contemplating
future schemes.
In essence, the Court is imposing a rules-based
jurisprudence that may be at odds with a more principlesbased approach. The same approach was used in crafting the
Sarbanes-Oxley financial reporting legislation, and was
criticized at the time (and still is today) for being overly
rules-driven (e.g., Rockness & Rockness, 2005). But rules
can always be circumvented; principles are more elastic in
their application but arguably more representative of the
underlying ethical foundation and behavior they are intended
to enshrine (see e.g., Kant, 1964). At a time when scholars

advanced, the record was not sufficiently clear as to the
extent to which the conviction relied upon honest services in
whole or in part. If Skilling had been convicted on grounds
other than honest services fraud, that part of the conviction
would stand. To the extent that his conviction was grounded
on honest services, though, the Court’s ruling would result in
acquittal since the case did not involve bribery or kickbacks
under the new rule. As of this writing, we will have some
time to wait before the issue is resolved and Skilling’s final
status decided. But it is indisputable that the honest services
doctrine is now more limited than had previously been the
case.
THE FUTURE: EVALUATING THE DECISION AND
ITS IMPACT ON FRAUD ENFORCEMENT AND
PREVENTION
As Skilling’s case shows us, other grounds for
conviction of miscreants often are available in prosecutions
of fraud and related offenses. As a consequence, it is
tempting to view the Skilling decision as nothing more than
a technical refinement of an arcane, and possibly
inconsequential, area of the law. To an extent, this is a fair
assessment, for the Court’s decision surely was correct as far
as the narrow issue of definitional clarity is concerned. The
statute’s wording is ambiguous if we view the matter as one
requiring absolute certainty of the action-reaction sequence,
and indeed many commentators were concerned by the
prospect of overzealous prosecutors pushing the limits of
construction to cover more and more “offenses” (e.g.,
Parloff, 2010). Balanced against the observation that other
theories of legal liability may still be pursued, the prospect
of abusive prosecution would seem to argue in favor of a
narrow interpretation.
But the Court’s reasoning in Skilling may still be
criticized on two grounds, one legal and one normative. In
terms of the legal analysis employed by the Court, the
approach of stripping a statute’s interpretation to its core
principles and applications works only in cases of limited
variance. That is, where circumstances are such that
absolute consistency in interpretation and practice point to a
given result or orientation, such a step may make sense.
(This does not resolve the issue of whether courts should
engage in such a practice; Scalia’s concurrence and the
majority opinion engaged in a sharp debate about this issue,
which remains beyond the scope of this article.) But if that
is the case, why is there a need to specify a core
interpretation at all? In fact, most statutes probably do not
fall into this category in the first instance, meaning that a
court’s resort to core application may be more arbitrary than
any opinions rendered under existing precedent. This seems
to be the case in Skilling: There were indeed a variety of
contextual parameters and fact patterns prosecuted at various
times under Sections 1341 and 1346. To say that a majority
involved bribery or kickbacks is correct, but is not a basis
for creating a firm rule that limits future application of the

76
Published by FHSU Scholars Repository, 2010

5

Journal of Business & Leadership: Research, Practice, and Teaching (2005-2012), Vol. 6 [2010], No. 1, Art. 8
Donoher

Journal of Business & Leadership: Research, Practice and Teaching
2010, Vol. 6, 72-77

Dunn, P. (2004). The impact of insider power on fraudulent
financial reporting. Journal of Management, 30, 397412.
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Law Review, 20, 423-464.
Kang, E. (2008). Director interlocks and spillover effects of
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M. (2006). Do CEO stock options prevent or promote
fraudulent financial reporting? Academy of Management
Journal, 49, 483-500.
Parloff, R. (2010). The catchall fraud law that catches too
much. Fortune Online, January 6.
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are recognizing the increasing need to focus on character and
values (e.g., Wright & Goodstein, 2007), and when evidence
of behavioral abuses in the boardroom and the executive
suite is accumulating (e.g., Donoher et al., 2007; Dunn,
2004; Kang, 2008; O’Connor et al., 2006), the abrogation of
a principles-based jurisprudence is troubling. Even if other
enforcement mechanisms exist, the removal of one tool
whose elasticity in fact was an advantage in terms of
enforcement and deterrence cannot aid enforcement or the
prevention of fraud. The rules-oriented approach advocated
in Skilling opens the door wider to the clever miscreant
whose imaginative, but not clearly prohibited, malfeasance
awaits discovery at some future point in time.
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